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The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is rooted in the proposition
that one's measure of justice under the law should not be diminished by
the fact that the person is male or female. It would engraft on the Consti-
tution a discrete application of the guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments that all are entitled to "equal protection" under law.
In 1972, ERA's general purpose was explained as follows in the re-
port of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
The basic principle on which the Amendment rests may be stated shortly:
sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of men or of
women .... The Amendment will affect only governmental action; the pri-
vate actions and the private relationships of men and women are unaffected.
And the Amendment only requires equal treatment of individuals.'
As a co-sponsor, Senator Hatfield offered much the same explanation
when ERA was reintroduced in the Senate on January 26, 1983. Such
explanations are useful guides to the general intent of ERA, but they do
* General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference.
S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). Professor Thomas I. Emerson, a recognized
expert on ERA, testified in 1971 that the "basic premise of the equal rights amendment is
that sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men." Hear-
ings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 401
(April 2, 1971).
Senator Hatfield explained:
"There is little debate about the general intent of the proposed amendment. Essen-
tially, it requires that the federal government and all State and local governments
treat each person, male and female, as an individual. It applies only to governmental
action; it does not affect private action or the purely private social relationships be-
tween men and women. By eliminating gender-based classifications in the law which
specifically deny equality of rights, every Federal or State law which makes a discrim-
inatory distinction would be invalid under the equal rights amendment."
129 CONG. REC. S535 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
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not lay bare the legal complexities which will ultimately shape its precise
effects through the judicial interpretive process.
The laws of the several states, in their diversity, have reflected the
views of society with respect to the "roles" of women and men. Whether
the product of a protectionist view or actual bias, the law has failed at
times in its duty of fairness. However, an objective response to this his-
torical reality will also recognize that the enlightenment of the day has
led to state and federal legislation which seeks earnestly to strip away
unjust distinctions based on sex.
Clearly, the evolutionary process is incomplete, despite significant
strides in the law, including state ERAs and federal and state legislation
targeted against sex discrimination. For example, federal statutes require
equal pay for equal work, and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex
in public and private employment and in education programs receiving
federal financial assistance.3 However, remedial federal statutes are per-
ceived by many as a piecemeal approach of great uncertainty because
they are subject to amendment and uneven administrative enforcement.
Similarly, state ERAs do not provide a uniform, national solution because
the majority of states have not adopted an ERA and, even where they
exist, interpretations can vary from state to state.
4
A federal ERA is considered necessary in order to achieve a durable,
uniform resolution to a national inequity. Its proponents are persuaded
that the equal protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments are inadequate because, in their view, they have not been con-
strued by the judiciary with sufficient rigor in reviewing statutory and
other classifications based on sex. In essence, ERA proposes to superim-
pose a more stringent standard upon constitutional equal protection guar-
antees in the discrete area of sex-based classifications. Whether it would
is a question worthy of most thoughtful reflection in view of the invalida-
tion of statutes which have discriminated on the basis of sex, experience
with comparable state ERAs, and the political and philosophical realities
in our contemporary society.
II. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE PROCESS
The ERA will mean what the judiciary declares it means, within the
somewhat flexible bounds of the canons of construction (discussed below).
The ultimate interpretive authority will be the United States Supreme
I See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (1982).
4 See 129 CONG. REC., supra note 2, at S539 (statement of Sen. Cranston in support of
ERA).
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Court. The course of this process will turn upon the language of ERA and
its legislative history. Legislative clarity will give direction to this process
and better assure fidelity to the will of the people.
A. Legislative History Of ERA
To the extent that legislative history may be considered by the judi-
ciary in determining the meaning of law, the history of ERA thus far will
do little to illuminate its terms in many areas of interpretational contro-
versy and concern.
The present ERA was introduced in both houses very early in the
first session of the 98th Congress which adjourned on October 12, 1984. In
the House of Representatives, hearings were held in 1983 on the proposed
ERA; it was reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee with
no amendment. On November 15, 1983 a motion was made to bring ERA
before a full House under a suspension of the rules, which would have the
effect of limiting debate and precluding amendments. The motion failed,
and there was no vote on the merits of ERA at that time. The ERA has
not been brought back before the full House, nor have committee hearing
records or committee reports been published.
In the Senate, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary held a series of hearings. No hearing records have
been published to date, and the Subcommittee took no final action.
In short, the pertinent legislative history of ERA remains to be devel-
oped if it is materially to influence judicial interpretation in significant
areas of concern. Yet, hope for effective clarifying history must fade
somewhat in view of the course of debate thus far. For example, in re-
sponse to questions on ERA's impact in several sensitive areas (e.g., abor-
tion, tax exemption, and private education), a co-sponsor repeatedly indi-
cated that the courts would have to resolve these issues." In the present
state of the record, the canons of judicial construction take on considera-
ble importance.
B. Canons Of Construction
Courts approach the problem of interpretation on two levels: intrin-
sic construction (dealing with the structure and language of the text) and
extrinsic construction (dealing with history and related statutes). 6 Consti-
tutional provisions are generally subject to the same rules of construction
I Hearings on S. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (May 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Paul E. Tsongas).
6 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.13-45.14 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972 &
Supp. 1984).
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as are statutes.7 Courts look first to the text of the law to discern whether
the meaning is plain. If the text is plain and unambiguous, courts need
not look to legislative history ' although they often have not hesistated to
do so.9 However, if language is open to more than one interpretation,
courts will examine legislative history for evidence of legislative intent. 10
Nevertheless, when reviewing legislative history, a court will avoid what
Justice Jackson called the "psychoanalysis of Congress."''
Legislative history is not very useful unless it is clear and authorita-
tive. Courts examine a variety of legislative materials. Reports of the
committee which heard testimony of interested persons and actively con-
sidered the text of the legislation are usually most persuasive in judging
the intent of the legislature." Courts will also examine reports of confer-
ence committees and floor debates where those reports or debates explain
various textual changes which were made outside of committee." Gener-
ally, however, remarks in the course of debates or hearings, except by the
sponsors or drafters, are entitled to little weight." Statements of single
legislators, even sponsors, are not controlling.'5
The lack of relevant, useful legislative history, however, does not re-
lieve courts of the duty "to give faithful meaning to the language Con-
gress adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting
the law in question."' 6 When the statute itself is ambiguous, courts must
construe it in the manner which best effectuates its policy. 7 Where a
See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373 (1921).
' See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (when statute is
plain on its face, need not look to legislative history).
o See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (no rule
of law forbade use of aids to construction however, clear the words may appear), rev'g 507
F.2d 743, 746-747 (10th Cir. 1974).
10 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 6 § 48.02, at 186.
" United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
" See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 6 § 48.06.
13 Id. at §§ 48.08, 48.13 & 48.18.
" See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 n.24 (1976).
" See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979).
16 See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976). This task is, in other words, an
application of the rule that a reviewing court is to give effect to the plain meaning of the
statute as best evidenced by the legislative intent. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 386 (1805). See also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
608 (1979). Where words have an ordinary or settled meaning, the reviewing court must
infer that Congress intended those meanings unless some other evidence in the statute or its
legislative history indicates otherwise. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329
(1981).
" See Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins., 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974). See also United States
v. An Article of Drug, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (where statute's language imprecise, should
be interpreted in light of statutory purpose).
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statute expresses broad national policy, such as is often found in constitu-
tional provisions, courts construe terms broadly to satisfy congressional
objectives. 8 This canon accords with another generally accepted rule of
interpretation: a court will liberally construe remedial legislation, such as
anti-discrimination laws, in order to carry out the purposes of the enact-
ment.1" The rule of liberal construction compounds the problems of ambi-
guity. Among other things, ambiguity invites a judicial subjectivism which
declares what Congress "must have" meant.
A British jurist once stated this salutory principle regarding legisla-
tive drafting:
[I]t is not enough to attain a degree of precision which a person reading [a
law] in good faith can understand; but it is necessary to attain if possible to
a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot
misunderstand.2 0
In the end, the limitations of language as a means of conveying ideas
make it important also to stress the importance of clarity of legislative
purpose as a most reliable guide to judicial interpretation."
III. ERA SECTION 1 - ANALYSIS OF MAJOR COMPONENTS
In very general terms, section 1 contains the substantive provisions of
ERA, and section 2 authorizes Congress to enact laws to enforce those
provisions. The text is identical to that of the unsuccessful amendment
approved by the 92d Congress in 1972. Section 1 provides: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of sex." In particular cases, the issue could
well require the interpretation of practically any single word. For present
purposes, however, it seems sufficient to consider its principal compo-
nents, namely (1) equality of rights under the law, (2) denial or abridge-
ment by the United States or any State, (3) on account of sex.
Before addressing those components, it will be useful to consider the
principles of judicial review which measure the limits of constitutionally
permissible governmental discretion in prescribing classifications of peo-
ple in regard to their rights, privileges and immunities, and the level of
review likely to apply to ERA.
A. Judicial Review of Sex-Based Classifications Under ERA
The equal protection precedents declare that statutory classifications
" See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
" See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 504 (1870).
o In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 147, 167 (1891) (Stephen, J.)
" See Conrad, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458 (1947).
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are subject to three different levels of judicial scrutiny, depending on the
type of classification involved. A major objective of ERA is to subject sex-
based classifications to a strict judicial scrutiny, akin to that applied to
racial classifications under the equal protection guarantees of the Consti-
tution. Classifications which burden fundamental constitutional rights
(e.g., free speech and free exercise of religion), or which are based on race
or national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications are
considered inherently "suspect." They are presumptively invalid2 2 and
are unlikely to survive strict scrutiny analysis.
Classifications based on sex have been subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny. They are upheld only upon a showing that the classifica-
tion serves important governmental objectives.2 3 Classifications premised
upon the alleged inherent handicap, weakness or inferiority of a gender
are not deemed legitimate governmental objectives under the equal pro-
tection clause. In recent years, the following classifications based on sex
have been invalidated: (i) a statute that gave the husband the unilateral
right to dispose of jointly owned property without his wife's consent;2" (ii)
a law under which survivor benefits paid to a husband in case of his wife's
work-related death were less than those payable to a similarly situated
widow;25 (iii) a statute that provided a shorter period of parental support
obligation for female children than for male children;2 6 ,(iv) a provision in
the Social Security Act granting survivors' benefits to widows but not
widowers;2 7 (v) a statute containing a mandatory preference for male ap-
plicants;28 and (vi) an arbitrary preference in favor of males in the admin-
istration of decedents' estates.29
In general, other classifications are subject only to the requirement
that they be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.2 0
Classifications subject to this test are routinely upheld, in due deference
to the government's need to make reasonable classifications as it carries
out its functions.
It is likely that the courts would employ the standard of strict scru-
tiny, effectively treating classifications based on sex as inherently "sus-
pect." To withstand strict scrutiny, gender-based classifications would
have to further a "compelling governmental interest." As noted, this level
of scrutiny has routinely led to the invalidation of racial classifications
s See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
22 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
24 See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460-62 (1981).
25 See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-53 (1980).
26 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-17 (1975).
2" See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-46 (1975).
" See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
29 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
31 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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under the equal protection clause. However, it is unlikely that "strict
scrutiny" review will be as preclusive under ERA. There will likely be
situations in which courts will uphold gender-based classifications (e.g.,
rape laws) as has happened with some state ERAs.
B. "Equality of Rights" Analogous state ERAs
Of the sixteen state ERAs, only eight employ the phrase "equality of
rights" (or like language) as does the federal ERA."' The interpretation of
such a phrase varies among the states, and even within a single state. The
articulated standard of equality ranges from what may be termed abso-
lute equality between men and women, to a standard of different treat-
ment, with a "rational basis" for such disparity.
The Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington ERAs have been in-
terpreted to mandate an absolute standard of equality more stringent
than traditional strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 2 However, even under an allegedly absolute
standard, courts have carved out exceptions where differentiation be-
tween the sexes is based on unique physical characteristics."3 Addition-
ally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth (appellate) Court has upheld a
medicaid exclusion of abortion on the ground that the exception was
based on indigency, not on gender s. 3  The Colorado and Massachusetts
ERAs have been interpreted to require strict judicial scrutiny,35 as is re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment for racial classifications. This stan-
31 Colorado: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state
of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29
(1980); Hawaii: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
State on account of sex." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21 (1976); Maryland: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD. CONST. DECL. OF ROTS.,
art. XLVI (1981); Massachusetts: "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (1979); New
Hampshire: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state
on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. II(d) (1986);
Pennsylvania: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. I, § 28
(1985); Texas: "Equality of the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race,
color, creed, or national origin." Tsx. CONST. art. I, § 3a (1984); Washington: "Equality of
rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1985).
"2 See Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 905-05 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 293, 328 A.2d 851, 855 (1974); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 864,
540 P.2d 882, 888 (1975).
" See, e.g., Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 587, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978).
34 Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 85 Pa. Commw. 242 (1984).
35 See People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 26, 514 P.2d 769, 770 (1973) (mandating "closet" judi-
cial scrutiny); Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 14, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (1977).
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dard, too, has been interpreted to permit exceptions for unique physical
characteristics. Where different treatment is reasonably and genuinely
based on such characteristics, the sexes are not considered similarly situ-
ated and, thus, equal treatment is not required.36
In Hawaii, while not articulating precisely the required standard, a
court has indicated that the state ERA may mandate the higher standard
of strict scrutiny.3 7 However, in upholding a gender-based rape statute on
the grounds that the differentiation was based on unique physical charac-
teristics, the court resorted to the fourteenth amendment standard for
sex-based distinctions, i.e., substantial relationship to government inter-
ests. 8
The Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the standard of equal-
ity required by that state's ERA. However, intermediate appellate courts
have dealt with the issue with different results. One held that the ERA
required strict scrutiny with exceptions for unique physical characteris-
tics, countervailing constitutionally protected rights, and other compel-
ling state interests." The other held that ERA required application of
only the rational relationship test.40 Finally, the standard of equality re-
mains unclear in at least one state.'
In summary, the meaning of "equality of rights" is not uniform
under the state ERAs. Nonetheless, it is fair to say generally that states'
ERAs have been interpreted to guarantee the same rights as are guaran-
teed under the equal protection clause for racial classifications, with the
most prevalent exception being for classifications justified by unique
physical characteristics. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 4
(prohibiting sex discrimination in employment) has been similarly inter-
preted where unique physical characteristics have been involved. The Su-
preme Court upheld the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disa-
bility policy against claims that it violated sex discrimination provisions
of Title VII." Because pregnancy is significantly different from the usual
See People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 174, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (1976).
87 See, e.g., Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 349, 581 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1978) (court may
apply more stringent test of compelling state interest in scrutinizing sex-based
classifications).
" See State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 123, 612 P.2d 526, 529 (1980).
"8 See Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
40 See Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
" See Buckner v. Buckner, 120 N.H. 402, 403, 415 A.2d 871, 872 (1980).
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982): "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin ......
" See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). Title VII was amended in
1978 to overturn the Gilbert decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEws 4749.
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covered diseases or disabilities, the Court held that its exclusion was not
the result of sex discrimination but of legitimate distinctions among med-
ical conditions."
The phrase "equality of rights" does not appear to convey, by itself,
a meaning other than the concept of fair and equal treatment under the
equal protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have analyzed the phrase "equal
rights" and like language in jurisdictional statutes affecting statutory and
constitutional civil rights claims.45 Specifically, the Supreme Court cited
the origin of the relevant language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from
which the fourteenth amendment evolved, and concluded that laws pro-
viding for "equal rights" are comparable to this fourteenth amendment
forerunner.4
C. "On Account of Sex" Gender v. Sexual Preference or Orientation
The text of ERA suggests no meaning for the phrase "on account of
sex" other than the usual meaning of gender.47 The co-sponsors have con-
sistently indicated this understanding of the term," as distinguished from
" A pregnancy-based exclusion in a state disability compensation program was held not to
constitute sex discrimination violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The court found no risk from which men were protected and women were not,
and vice versa. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 496 n.20 (1974).
-5 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982) places in the federal courts actions "[t]o redress the depri-
vation .. .of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens . . . [emphasis
added]." Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982) authorizes the removal to federal court of an action:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law. [emphasis added].
Id.
"6 Id. See Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615 (1979). See also Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 789 (1966); Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 834-37 (4th Cir. 1974); Mc-
Guire v. Amrein, 101 F.Supp 414, 417-18 (D. Md. 1951).
' Black's Law Dictionary defines "sex" as "[tihe sum of the peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of being male or
female." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (5th ed. 1979).
" See, e.g., 129 CONG. RECORD S535 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). Senator Hatfield: "By elimi-
nating gender-based classifications in the law which specifically deny equality of rights,
every Federal or State law which makes a discriminatory distinction would be invalid under
the equal rights amendment." Id. Senator Specter: "It will stand as a statement of our belief
as a country that discrimination based on the immutable fact of a person's gender will not
be allowed." Id. at S536. Senator Tsongas: "ERA is necessary because thousands of Federal,
State, and local statutes - by law - treat American citizens differently depending upon their
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sexual or affectional orientation or preference ("sexual preference"). In
fact, Senator Hatfield cited favorably the fact that no state ERA had
been interpreted as invalidating laws prohibiting the marriage of homo-
sexual persons."" However, in 1972 Senator Sam Ervin warned that ERA
could invalidate laws forbidding same sex marriage and certain homosex-
ual activity. 60 Some ERA commentators perceive the same result. 1 Re-
cently, several witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
the Constitution questioned the view that ERA would not undermine
laws regulating homosexual conduct if they apply equally to male and
female homosexuals. 5
Courts interpreting Title VII consistently have rejected claims that
sex discrimination includes employment discrimination against homosex-
uals or transsexuals.53 As one court put it, reading Title VII to cover such
claims would be "impermissibly contrived and inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the words."' In the present state of the law, it is unlikely that
the term "sex" in ERA would be construed other than as referring to
discrimination between the genders. Yet, recent legal developments in-
volving the right of privacy in the field of abortion and kindred areas do
not put a more liberal view of the term "sex" beyond the range of possi-
sex." Id. at S529. Senator Sarbanes: "The ERA is based on the fundamental proposition
that sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women or of men .... "
Id. at S537. Senator Cranston: "It would give constitutional force to the basic principle that
government at all levels should treat women and men as individuals having equal rights
under the law." Id. at 8538.
49 Id. at S535.
" S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 47, citing testimony by Prof. Paul Freund of Harvard
Law School and Prof. James White of the University of Michigan Law School.
61 See 0. HATCH, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, MYTHS AND REALITIES 51-55 (1983); Bevi-
lacqua, The ERA in Debate - What Can it Mean for Church Law?, 24 CATH. LAW. 101, 127-
29 (1979).
5 Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 942.85 (May 23 and June 22, 1984)(statements by
Prof. Raymond Marcin of Catholic University Law School, Prof. Eugene Hickok, Jr., of
Dickinson College and Center for the Study of the Constitution, and Prof. Lynn Wardle of
Brigham Young University Law School).
" See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (transsex-
ualism); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (homosexuality); Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (transsexxualism); Grossman v.
Board of Educ., 11 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1196, 1199 (D.N.J. 1975) aff'd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F.
Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal.) (transsexualism), affd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975).
"4 Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (male employee living as
woman as prerequisite to sex-change operation). Judicial interpretations of the term "sex"
as "gender" were based in part upon subsequent legislative history involving numerous un-
successful attempts to amend Title VII to include a specific provision covering discrimina-
tion on the basis of "sexual preference." See Sommers v. Budget Marketing Inc., 667 F.2d
748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
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bility, 55 at least in the absence of more precision in the text or compelling
legislative history.
D. Discrimination Intent or Effect
The phrase "on account of" usually means "by reason of' or "be-
cause of"" and would seem to indicate that, on its face, ERA is intended
to reach only intentional discrimination. 7 However, ERA could possibly
reach other actions which have a discriminatory effect on one gender or
aid discriminatory institutions. If ERA were to yield the latter result, its
reach could be substantially broader than that of the equal protection
guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Prior to 1976 there was some question regarding the appropriate test
to be used in race discrimination cases brought under the equal protec-
tion clause. Then the Supreme Court enunciated "the basic equal protec-
tion principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose."" The Court observed that the discriminatory purpose might be
found in a statute itself, or its application in an intentionally discrimina-
tory manner. Subsequently, the Court upheld veterans' preferences in
state civil service employment, despite their disparate effect on women,
because there was no showing of purposeful discrimination against
women.5 9 Supporters of ERA have indicated that the result would have
been different under ERA.60
By analogy to the equal protection clause, ERA could also be inter-
preted to prohibit the government from aiding private institutions that
discriminate on the basis of sex. Earlier cases involving desegregation of
public schools have held that government programs are invalid under the
equal protection clause when they have the impermissible effect of pro-
viding significant aid to private, racially discriminatory institutions." A
" But see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court
held that the constitutional right of privacy did not include the right to engage in homosex-
ual conduct and upheld the U.S. Navy's discharge of an individual for engaging in homosex-
ual conduct. Id.
51 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) (1976).
57 See, e.g., Personnel Adm'n v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.24 (1979) (court relying on
objective factors to prove discriminatory intent).
51 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (employment test that had disparate im-
pact on minorities upheld).
" See Personnel Adm'n, 442 U.S. at 281.
" Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of Professors
Thomas I. Emerson and Ann E. Freedman).
"' See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1973), and cases cited therein. Norwood
has not been overruled by the Court.
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lower court recently held that equal protection principles prohibited a
federal agency from funding local agencies which it knew or should have
known were engaged in racial discrimination.
62
E. Denial or Abridgement of Rights "By the United States or by Any
State"
The ERA explicitly addresses only actions taken "by the United
States or by any State." That it is not intended to reach the private acts
of individuals or organizations seems clear from its language and its
sparse legislative history. However, in certain situations ERA could be
made applicable to private organizations. The fourteenth amendment has
been applied to private activity because of significant state involvement
in that activity. 8 A similar result can be expected under ERA.
The Supreme Court employs several principals in determining
whether the actions of a private organization will be deemed state action,
thereby subjecting that organization to the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. First, there must be a nexus between the state and
the challenged action of the private entity so close that the action may
fairly be deemed that of the state itself." Second, private discriminatory
action may be considered state action where the state has required it, or
has provided such significant encouragement that the action must in law
be deemed that of the state.6" Third, the required nexus may be present if
the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state.66 The ultimate issue for analysis is whether the
alleged infringement of constitutional rights is "fairly attributable to the
state." 67 Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the signifi-
cance of state involvement be judged."
Applying these principles, the Court has found state action where
private individuals or organizations (i) acted in concert with state offi-
cials, or under compulsion of state law, to deprive individuals of property
or other protected rights;6  (ii) had a symbiotic relationship with a state
" See National Black Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 580-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 963. (1984).
" See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). The Supreme Court has indicated there
is an equivalent equal protection component implicit in the Fifth Amendment, which limits
the federal government. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546-48
(1983).
, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
" Id.
" Id. at 1005.
" Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
U Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1975).
4 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970).
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from which the state received financial benefits from discriminatory
acts;"0 and (iii) utilized the judicial system to attempt to enforce a restric-
tive covenant based on race.
By analogy, under ERA, private organizations which engage in sexu-
ally discriminatory practices would not likely be subject to ERA's
prohibitions unless those practices were attributable to a governmental
decision or the government was significantly involved in the discrimina-
tory practices. Under the Court's recent analysis,72 receipt of substantial
governmental benefits alone would not subject a private organization
(e.g., a private, single sex school) to ERA's requirements. However, it
must be cautioned that "state action" is a developing concept whose full
implications cannot be assessed. The extent to which private organiza-
tions would be affected by ERA will depend, in part, on the development
of state action doctrine under ERA. The relevance of this consideration
to church institutions is discussed below.
IV. ERA SECTION 2 ENFORCEMENT
Section 2 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." This provision is
identical to the enforcement section of the fourteenth amendment, and is
similar to enforcement provisions in six others."
Under existing federal statutes,74 a citizen affected by sex discrimina-
tion could sue for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress a violation
of rights under ERA. When enacted in the nineteenth century, the Civil
Rights Acts were aimed at eliminating racial discrimination." Over time,
the Court has expanded its understanding and use of the fourteenth
amendment and has applied it to invalidate gender-based discrimina-
tion.7 6 Accordingly, a lawsuit under existing Civil Rights Acts may be
70 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
7' Those six amendments which had enforcement provisions similar to the ERA are the
thirteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth amend-
ments. See S. REP. 689, supra note 1, at 20. The only difference in the enforcement provi-
sions of the latter amendments is the placement of the clause "by appropriate legislation" at
the end, rather than in the middle, of the section. We can see no intended textual difference
in the placement of the clause. In either location it modifies the infinitive "to enforce" and
answers the question "how."
7- 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). There is neither a private right nor a
statutory right to seek damages under the Civil Rights Act. Lyle v. Village of Golden Valley,
310 F. Supp. 852, 854 (D. Minn. 1970).
75 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880). But see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 347 (1880) (fourteenth amendment to secure "equal rights to all persons").
76 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (invalidating law treating un-
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used to enjoin gender-based discrimination."' Because the Supreme Court
has held that such lawsuits are not limited simply to civil rights legisla-
tion but are available to vindicate all federal rightss7 8 the same provisions
may be used to enforce the ERA. Thus, existing federal law will provide a
substantial enforcement mechanism if ERA is enacted.
7 9
In addition, the Congress will have the discretion to enact laws "nec-
essary and proper" for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of
ERA. 0 Under its enforcement authority, the Congress is not limited to
those matters which a court itself would void as unconstitutional. Rather,
the Congress through legislation may affirmatively protect rights and de-
clare certain acts illegal in order to enforce the Amendment.8 ' Thus by
reference to fourteenth amendment principles, a court would interpret
ERA as authorizing the Congress to enforce ERA guarantees by any ra-
tional means. 82
Constitutional provisions such as ERA and the fourteenth amend-
married parents differently based on sex).
77 See, e.g., Lyon v. Temple Univ., 543 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Walker v. Hall,
.399 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (three-judge court), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Craig v. Boren, 291 U.S. 190 (1976). Although section 1983 provides a cause of action
for sex discrimination, by contrast, section 1981, by its own terms, is limited to racial dis-
crimination and may not be used to challenge alleged sex discrimination. Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
78 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 6-8 (1980) (Social Security Act violations within scope
of section 1983 action). The Court expressly rejected an argument that Civil Rights Act
lawsuits are limited to civil rights and equal protection laws.
7' Even where a statute did not, in so many words, provide a remedy, a court could, under
the statute, infer a remedy if it would be consistent with the apparent intent of the Con-
gress. For example, in Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945), the Court allowed recovery
of a debt for seizure of property in World War II under a statute limited to debts existing in
World War I. See also McGhee v. United States, 154 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand., J.)
(broadly interpreting a statute to allow alien seamen to sue in any U.S. district court for
claims against the United States). Thus, one commentator has remarked that judges do not
necessarily feel bound by rigid form when they believe justice dictates a particular end.
Conrad, New Ways To Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458 (1947).
80 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880). The enforcement power under amendments is like the power Con-
gress enjoys under the Constitution - to make laws "necessary and proper" to the articu-
lated powers. Any law reasonably to these purposes will be upheld. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at
650-51.
8' See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
" Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648-49, 651 n.10. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grissel, 567 F.2d 1267, 1272
(4th Cir. 1977) (applying rational basis standard to age restriction for police applicants);
Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1977) (allowing assessment of attorneys' fees
against state officials sued in their official capacity), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). More
importantly for purposes of our analysis, the enforcement provision does not allow the Con-
gress to "restrict or abrogate or dilute" any of the rights guaranteed by the substantive
provisions but only to protect or extend that substance by any means "necessary and
proper." See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
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ment, and related statutes, are liberally construed.8 3 It is reasonable,
under ERA, to expect judicially created private rights of action which are
not expressly provided under existing statutes.84 The Supreme Court al-
lowed a private right of action for sex discrimination under federal civil
rights legislation. 5 It concluded that, by enacting the statute in question,
Congress intended to benefit women as a special class, that civil rights
legislation was intended to be construed broadly, and that the private
right of action would promote the congressional policy against dis-
crimination.
V. ERA SECTION 3 EFFECTIVE DATE
Section 3 provides that ERA "shall take effect two years after the
date of ratification." The rationale for such a delay is explained in the
1972 Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "The purpose of
this section is to give the States and the federal government an opportu-
nity to review and revise their laws, regulations and practices so as to
bring them into compliance with the Amendment." 8 The drive for ratifi-
cation of the 1972 ERA has been credited with contributing to important
reforms in some states.8 7 It is reasonable to assume that, with ratification
of ERA, the states and federal government would make additional efforts
to bring their laws, regulations and practices into conformity with ERA's
mandate.
VI. SALUTARY EFFECTS OF ERA
ERA would buttress the cause of fair treatment under law for all,
particularly women. Its effects would reach an array of legal areas and
social relationships in jurisdictions (state and federal) so numerous that
they defy comprehensive and precise analysis in this document. In fact,
and understandably, no document has provided such an analysis.
83 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
"' Whether a private right of action would be inferred in any given instance would depend
on weighing of four factors: Whether 1) the statute was enacted for the special benefit of a
class which included the plaintiff, 2) the legislature intended to create a private right as
evidenced in the legislative history, 3) the existence of a private right of action would be
consistent with legislative policy, and 4) a private right would be inappropriate because of
overriding State concerns. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In later cases, the Court has
focused heavily on Congress' intent as the key element of the analysis. Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).
8" In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the legislation in question was
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
" S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 20-21.
8" B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW - THE IMPACT
OF THE ERA ON STATE LAWS, 37-38 (1977).
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A. An Overview
It is fair to say that although there is great diversity of opinion re-
garding the probable salutary effects of ERA, a significant body of opin-
ion envisions important strides in the direction of fair and equal treat-
ment irrespective of sex. I say this based upon our exhaustive review of
most if not all of the available, significant testimony and written com-
mentary on the subject, principal examples of which are cited below."8
Thus, ERA is regarded by many as a means of enhancing the economic
situation of women by (i) eliminating state and federal laws or practices
that exclude women from certain employment opportunities, or otherwise
limit their participation, 9 (ii) providing for more equitable ownership
88 Congressional Reports, Testimony and Hearings: S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1; H. REP.
359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 35 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
House Comm. of the House on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on S.J.
Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. (1984) testimony of: Lynn D. Wardle, Brigham Young University (June 22,
1984), Raymond B. Marcin, Catholic University (May 23, 1984), Judith Welch Wegner, Uni-
versity of North Carolina (April 23, 1984), Gary L. McDowell, Tulane University (February
21, 1984), Ann E. Freedman, Rutgers University (January 24, 1984), John T. Noonon, Jr.,
University of California at Berkley (January 24, 1984), Senator Bob Packwood, Oregon,
(November 1, 1983), Eliot Cohen, Harvard University (November 1, 1983), Antonia Handler
Chayes, law firm of Csaplar and Bok (November 1, 1983), Jeremy A. Rabkin, Cornell Uni-
versity (September 13, 1983), Donna E. Shalala, Hunter College of the City of New York
(September 13, 1983), Senator Paul Tsongas, Massachussetts (May 26, 1983); Hearings on
H.R.J. Res. I Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1985) testimony of: Ann E. Freedman, Rutgers University
(November 3, 1983), Jules B. Gerard, Washington University (St. Louis) (October 19, 1983),
Henry C. Karlson, Indiana University (October 20, 1983), Diana Pearce, Center For Na-
tional Policy Review, Catholic University (September 14, 1983), Francine Bernice Sandler,
Association of Women (September 14, 1983), Tish Sommers, Older Women's League, Cali-
fornia (September 14, 1983), Polly Madlenwald, National Federation of Business and Pro-
fessional Women (September 14, 1983), Eunice Cole, American Nurses Association (Septem-
ber 14, 1983), Mary H. Futrell, National Education Association (September 14, 1983), Mary
Purcell, American Association of University Women (September 14, 1983), Judy Goldsmith,
National Organization for Women (September 14, 1983), Kathy Wilson, National Women's
Political Caucus (September 14, 1983), Governor Richard Lamm, Colorado (July 13, 1983),
Grover Rees, University of Texas (July 13, 1983), Mary Frances Bery, U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (July 13, 1983).
See generally B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW
- THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE LAWS (1977) [hereinafter IMPACT OF ERA]; R. EISLER,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1978); L. GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
WOMEN, CASES IN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1975); 0. HATCH, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT, MYTHS AND REALITIES (1983); L. KANOWITZ, EQUAL RIGHTS: THE MAL STAKE (1981); H.
KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981); R. LEE, A LAW-
YER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1980); P. SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSI-
TIVE WOMAN (1977); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT.
GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1981); U.S. COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1978); G. WHITTEN-
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and control of property acquired during marriage, (iii) requiring more eq-
uitable treatment for women under the social security system and stat-
utes regulating private pension plans,90 (iv) expanding opportunities for
women in the military,91 (v) eliminating gender-based wage discrimina-
tion in public employment," and (vi) lowering the cost to women of cer-
tain kinds of insurance.9"
In the important area of education, the 1972 Senate Report stated
that "ERA will require that State supported schools at all levels eliminate
laws, regulations or government practices which exclude women or limit
their numbers. '94 In the particularly complex area of athletics, ERA
could provide an effective means for attaining equal athletic opportunity
for women, including gender-neutral rules, equal per capita expenditures,
and the creation and implementation of affirmative action programs.9 5
Exceptional female athletes could be allowed to compete with the best
male athletes in their communities.9" In addition, many view ERA as an
effective bar to sex discrimination in other areas such as criminal law
(e.g., sentencing and prison reform) 97 and domestic relations law.98
In addition to its legal effects, ERA could also perform an important
symbolic function as part of our fundamental law, providing equal rights
for individuals regardless of their sex. 99 The legal and extralegal impact of
ERA could work in tandem to provide women new opportunities, in-
BERG, THE ERA AND YOU (1975).
90 See generally Bevilacqua, The ERA in Debate - What Can It Mean For Church Law?, 24
CATH. LAW. 101 (1979); Brown, Emerson, Falk and Feedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Dow,
Sexual Equality, the ERA and the Court - A Tale of Two Failures, 13 N.M. L. REv. 53
(1983); Emerson and Lifton, Should the ERA Be Ratified? 55 CONN. B. J. 227 (1981); Erik-
son, Equality Between the Sexes in the 1980's, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 591 (1979); Ginsburg,
Ratification of ERA, 57 TEx. L. REV. 919 (1979); Strong, Contributions of ERA to Constitu-
tional Exegesis, 14 GA. L. REV. 389 (1980); Note, Congressional Intent and ERA, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 637 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law - Sex Discrimination under the Equal Rights
Amendment, 54 WASH. REV. 709 (1979).
"4 See IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 208-33; CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 6-7; S. REP. No. 689, supra note 2, at 14-15.
" See IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 160-176; CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 9-14.
93 Hearings on H.R. J. Res I Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comn. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 12-13 (1983) (statement of Ann E. Freed-
man, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School); CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 15-16.
94 See S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 13-14.
95 See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 8.
" See IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 94-96.
9 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 16-17.
93 IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 304-308.
99 See id. at 307.
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creased self-esteem, and psychological motivation to expand their
horizons. 100
B. Impact on Discrete Areas of Federal Law
Because of their importance, it will be useful to review briefly the
potential of ERA in two areas of federal law, i.e. the law governing the
social security system and the military. These have generated much
discussion.
1. Social Security
There is an increased public awareness and concern over the num-
bers of women living in poverty.' The plight of older women is of partic-
ular concern.10 2 Often they must rely on social security payments as their
primary means of support. For a variety of reasons (e.g. years spent out of
the work force as homemakers, lower average wages, part-time or short
term employment), average benefits are lower for women than men under
the present social security system.'0 3 ERA could require revisions in the
social security system and pension laws (e.g., the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")) to provide for more equitable
treatment of women.10 4
If discrimination is measured by effect rather than intent, laws which
have a "disparate effect" on women would be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny under ERA.10 The perceived flaw in laws such as the Social Se-
curity Act and ERISA is that they do not take into account the life pat-
terns of many women, or recognize the economic contribution made by
homemakers to the family unit.10 6 Thus, it has been observed that ERA
would require Congress to review the provisions of the Social Security Act
and ERISA, and make amendments where necessary to treat women
more fairly. 0 7 If the "disparate effect" standard were utilized by courts,
ERA could lead to additional benefits for women under the Social Secur-
ity Act and other statutes affecting retirement. It is beyond the scope of
'*0 See id. at 83-91; S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 16.
101 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 17-18.
'2 IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 11-12.
.os See Statement of Shirley Sandage, Executive Director of the Older Women's League, on
Pension Equity for Women Before the Subcomnm. on Labor-Management Relations of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor (September 29, 1983).
10" See Statement of Freedman, supra note 93, at 13. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE EQuAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT, supra note 89, at 14-16.
1o See Statement of Freedman, supra note 93, at 13; IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 17-
19.1
106 See Statement of Freedman, supra note 93, at 13.
107 Id.
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this article to attempt a delineation of what those benefits might be, how
they would be funded, or what effect they might have on other partici-
pants in the affected programs.
It should be noted that Congress has already taken some steps to
eliminate inequities in the Social Security Act and ERISA. In the Social
Security Amendments of 1983, certain gender-based distinctions were
eliminated from the Social Security Act.10 Congress also required the De-
partment of Health and Human Services to prepare a report analyzing
the potential impact of various "earnings sharing" proposals on the social
security system. 09 Generally, under "earnings sharing" the combined
earnings of a husband and wife during the period of their marriage would
be divided equally between them for benefit purposes, providing each
spouse with social security protection in his or her own right."0 The Re-
tirement Equity Act of 1984 made several amendments to ERISA,
designed to provide greater pension equity for women by taking into ac-
count changes in work patterns and in marriage as an economic
partnership."'
2. The Military
The legislative history of the 1972 ERA strongly suggested that ERA
could have a substantial impact on the role of women in the military. It
indicated that women would be allowed to volunteer for service, and be
subject to conscription, on the same basis as men," 2 and that like men,
women could be assigned to various duties depending on their qualifica-
tions and the service's needs." s Although it is incomplete, thus far there
is nothing in the legislative history of the present ERA to indicate a con-
trary intent in this area." 4 Expanding opportunities in the military for
188 Social Security Admendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 301-310, 97 Stat. 109-17
(1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1305 (Supp. 1 1983)). To illustrate, the amend-
ments provide that illegitimate children would be eligible for benefits based on their
mothers' earnings as previously had been the case with respect to their fathers' earnings.
The Amendments also extend to men certain benefits that had been limited to women, e.g.,
aged divorced husbands can now receive benefits based on their former wives' earnings
records.
'" Id. at § 343, 97 Stat. 136-37 (1983). The report has not yet been submitted to Congress.
However, a statement on its status by Martha A. McSteen (Acting Commissioner of Social
Security before the Task Force On Social Security and Women of the House Select Comm.
on Aging) on April 12, 1984, points out the complexity and difficult policy choices inherent
in any substantial revision of the social security system.
110 Id.
.. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 101, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. II 1984)).
"I S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 13-14.
. Id. at 13.
"' See Testimony of Prof. Eliot Cohen, Harvard University, and Antonia Handler Chayes,
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qualified women would be beneficial in several respects." 5 It is reasonable
to expect that more women would be able to take advantage of the nu-
merous benefits of military service (e.g., education, technical training,
medical care and veterans' benefits), and that more women would be eli-
gible for veterans' preferences in government employment." 6
Regarding combat assignments, it has been observed that only a rela-
tively small percentage of the military actually serves in combat, and only
women that could meet the qualifications would be assigned to combat
units.'1 7 Whether present proscriptions"15 against the use of women in
combat units would survive judicial scrutiny under ERA will ultimately
depend on the standard of review adopted by the courts. If, as some
urge,1 9 all explicit gender-based classifications would be impermissible
under ERA, the survival of a policy prohibiting only women from serving
in combat is unlikely. 20 On the other hand, courts have traditionally ac-
corded great deference to Congress in matters involving national defense
and military affairs.' 2 ' In the absence of clear legislative history to the
contrary, it seems improbable that the judiciary would abandon its usual
deference in this sensitive area and invalidate rational, longstanding
prohibitions on the use of women in combat units.
C. Impact on Discrete Areas of State Law
Of the various state laws potentially affected by ERA, those dealing
with domestic relations and employment are especially important and
warrant particular attention.
1. Domestic Relations
Generally speaking, ERA could substantially affect state domestic re-
lations laws. Under ERA, they would have to be based solely on individ-
Esq., before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (No-
vember 1, 1983).
11 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 13.
116 Id.
17 IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 977.
118 Women are generally excluded from serving in combat units by statute (Navy and Air
Force) or as a matter of established policy (Army and Marine Corps). See Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-78 (1981), and authorities cited therein.
"' IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 889-93. See Testimony of Thomas I. Emerson, Lines
Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School, before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm. (October 19, 1983); IMPACT oF ERA, supra note
88, at 14.
" Some commentators have concluded that existing proscriptions against women serving in
combat would be invalid. See Testimony of Prof. Eliot Cohen and Antonia Handler Chayes,
supra note 114.
" Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65.
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ual circumstances and needs, not on assumptions based solely on an indi-
vidual's sex. 22 Thus, a declaration of invalidity is probable with respect
to such presumptions that may exist, e.g., the father's primary responsi-
bility for the support of the family.'" The support obligations of each
spouse would be defined in functional terms based, for example, on each
spouse's earning power, current resources, and contributions (other than
financial) to the family welfare. 12 4 Upon dissolution of a marriage, it is
suggested that ERA would require states to provide for an equitable in-
terspousal distribution of assets acquired during the marriage,1 25 thereby
effectively recognizing the tangible contributions made to the marriage by
nonworking spouses (usually women). It should be noted that without
ERA, many states have adopted more equitable methods for division of
marital property in matrimonial cases.126
ERA could require changes in other areas of domestic relations law.
Some have concluded that the statutory age at which a state permits an
individual to marry would have to be the same for men and women. 2 7 It
has also been suggested that ERA would lead to the invalidation of stat-
utes or practices requiring wives to use their husbands' surnames, or re-
quiring children to use their fathers' surnames. 28 Further, some are of
the view that legal requirements establishing the domicile or residence of
individuals could not be based on sex, thus eliminating any presumptions




ERA could be violated by laws, to the extent they still exist, that
explicitly restrict or limit the occupations or conditions of employment
for women only, e.g., laws limiting the maximum number of hours
worked, excluding women from working in mines, and requiring rest peri-
ods.' 30 The 1972 Senate Report indicated that under ERA restrictive laws
(e.g., excluding women from certain occupations) would be invalidated,
whereas others that are truly protective (e.g., providing rest periods)
"I S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 17. See IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 97-207.
123 See R. LEE, supra note 89, at 69.
124 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 17.
I'l See IMPACT OF ERA, supra note 89, at 160-76.
126 Id.
... See id. at 101.
128 See id. at 102-111.
129 Special rules governing married women's domicile can result in differences in eligibility
for resident tuition at state schools, jury duty, voter registration, tax liability, and jurisdic-
tion over estates. Id. at 113.
160 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 14-15. See also IMPACT OF THE ERA, supra note 89, at
209-94.
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could be extended to protect both men and women.' 3 '
ERA would prohibit sex discrimination in employment practices in
state and local governments. In this area, ERA would overlap with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state fair employment practice
statutes which now prohibit sex discrimination in public employment.
ERA could fill gaps in statutes such as Title VII which does not apply to
members of Congress' and certain state elected officials,' 33 and could
further provide impetus for the more vigorous enforcement of anti-dis-
crimination laws and policies.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF CONCERN FOR CHURCHES AND THE PEOPLE THEY
SERVE
The implications of ERA have also given rise to concerns in diverse
areas of law and public policy. There follows a discussion of certain areas
of major concern to churches and the people they serve. Such an analysis
is essential to an objective consideration of ERA, and to provide balance
in the public debate by augmenting the available public commentary.
A. Abortion
1. Substantive Abortion Rights
The potential effect of ERA on a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy is limited because Roe v. Wade 34 and kindred cases are the
law. Courts will not attribute to Congress an intent to do an unnecessary
act. 35 There is no explicit indication in the text or legislative history that
Congress intends ERA to reinforce a right of abortion. Indeed, the legisla-
tive history reveals the absence of a congressional consensus on
abortion.'3
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is reasonable to consider ERA as
possessing the potential to buttress the substantive right of abortion. The
possible permutations of fact and legal principle under the doctrine of
Roe v. Wade have not been exhausted. There is some room for the regula-
tion of the abortion right based upon the compelling interest of the state
in the life and health of the mother (second and third trimester) and un-
born child (third trimester). This approach in the theory of the cases has
131 S. REP. No. 689, supra note 1, at 15.
... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982).
'33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
- 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1977).
Similarly, ERA proponents have argued that ERA and abortion are unrelated, the for-
mer being a matter of economic equity and the latter being a health/privacy issue. JOHNSON
& CUNNINGHAM, ERA AND ABORTIONS: REALLY SEPARATE ISSUES? 150 (1980).
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already been criticized by three members of the Supreme Court,"'7 and
the future course of the law seems somewhat uncertain. Although it is
unlikely the Court will overrule the Roe v. Wade line of cases in their
fundamental precepts, it is not unreasonable to anticipate more favorable
consideration of well-founded restrictions of abortion in the law. The pre-
sent Court has manifested its willingness to reassess its decisions in other
vital areas, 8 and no reason appears why abortion must be an exception
to that salutary process.
These observations counsel a sensitivity to the more subtle potential-
ities of ERA in the field of abortion. If there is any room for the meaning-
ful restriction of abortion under present legal theory or future holdings,
ERA could serve to diminish those prospects. In Roe v. Wade, the Court
grounded the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in considerations
of her health.1 8' The right to protect one's health and reproductive inter-
ests is grounded in the constitutional right to privacy."" Under ERA, the
Court would likely view abortion as a type of medical treatment, although
not identical, to other types. 14 Accordingly, there is a legitimate concern
that ERA could lead to the invalidation of laws which deny to women a
right not denied to men, namely, access to forms of medical "treatment"
needed to protect health, including abortion. In this way, ERA could but-
tress the Roe v. Wade right of abortion. It could fortify the principal
holding in Roe v. Wade, i.e. the right of privacy encompasses "a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. "114
2. Public Funding of Abortion
Although Roe v. Wade and other cases have established a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy, there is presently no federal constitu-
tional right to public financing of abortion."' s The denial of such funding
does not deprive women of any constitutional right, including rights
under the equal protection clause."' However, under ERA it is likely that
funding restrictions would be invalidated if certain established principles
are applied.
".. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
138 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (first amendment establishment clause
test); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Miranda rule).
".. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (state not re-
quired to pay for medically necessary abortions).
140 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
... Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
"' Harris, 448 U.S. at 297.
144 Id.
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Like pregnancy and childbirth, abortion is a procedure which only
women can undergo. Because ERA would probably render sex-based clas-
sifications suspect in the sense that term is used under the equal protec-
tion clause, a law excluding abortions from a comprehensive government-
sponsored medical program would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has already held that the government's interest in
fetal life does not become compelling until after viability." 5 Conse-
quently, a law excluding pre-viability abortions from a comprehensive
health benefit program might well not survive strict judicial scrutiny,
whether the program is based on the state's interest in fetal life or in
encouraging childbirth over abortion. " ' Further, in view of the mother's
somewhat qualified right to terminate her pregnancy after viability, the
same result could follow for this period of gestation as well.
In a very recent decision, a majority of the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court upheld the state's exclusion of funding for abortions (with
certain exceptions) against claims that it violated the equal protection
clause and Pennsylvania's ERA.1 4 7 The court held (two judges dissenting)
that the exclusion did not involve a gender-based classification cognizable
under the state's ERA. The decision has been appealed to the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court. The fact that the court was divided points up the
genuineness of this question with respect to the federal ERA. The case
also confirms the difficulties of predicting results under ERA. Further,
one decision involving a state ERA by a state intermediate appellate
court is of slight precedential value. This is especially so since the court
did not apply the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, as ERA seems likely
to require.
B. Rights of Homosexual Persons
An issue which has caused concern is the potential of ERA to sanc-
tion a homosexual lifestyle by incorporating it in the legal fabric in vari-
ous ways, for example, by compelling recognition of the marriage of ho-
1,5 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
1.6 Harris, 448 U.S. at 325. The Supreme Court in Harris concluded the abortion funding
restriction was discrimination based not on "sex" but on "indigency." The Court reaffirmed
that "indigency" is not a "suspect classification." Id. at 323. When the Court in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974), rejected an argument that a classification based on
pregnancy in a state disability compensation format was sex discrimination and found in-
stead it was based on medical condition, the dissent charged that the Court was backing
away from its decisions applying greater scrutiny to gender-based classifications. On another
occasion, one of the Geduldig majority explained that the absence of an ERA was an impor-
tant reason the Court decided not to apply "strict scrutiny" to such classifications. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
'47 Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, No. 283 C.D., slip op. at 14-16 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Sept. 20, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 67-MD-1984 (Pa. Oct. 3, 1984).
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mosexual persons, and by prohibiting employment and like policies which
exclude such persons (e.g., in employment by churches and other religious
organizations). The implications are self-evident in the discussions below
of areas of concern, such as ERA's potential on tax-exempt status. The
issue of marriage is distinct and warrants separate consideration.
Arguments that the refusal to permit same-sex marriages constitutes
unlawful sex discrimination have been rejected uniformly. In denying
such claims, courts generally have relied upon the traditional definition
and usage of the term "marriage" as a heterosexual union.14 8 Thus, a
Kentucky court held that two persons of the same sex had no constitu-
tionally protected right to marry. It concluded that the two women in-
volved were not prevented from marrying by the statutes of Kentucky,
but "rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that
term is defined."' 149 Most recently, a Pennsylvania Superior Court found
that history, public policy, and ordinary definition argue against expan-
sion of the concept of common law marriage to include same-sex
marriage.°50
Perhaps the most relevant case for present purposes is Singer v.
Hara'5' which was decided under a state ERA (Washington) substantially
similar to the proposed federal ERA. 2 Singer held that the statutory
prohibition against same-sex marriages did not violate the state ERA or
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the court's
view, the state ERA did not create new rights, but merely mandated that
existing rights be equally available to members of both sexes. Because by
definition marriage is a union between a man and a woman, the court
determined that the right sought by applicants did not exist, and there-
fore they were not denied a "right" (marriage license) on account of sex.
The court emphasized the "state's recognition that our society as a whole
views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation
and the rearing of children . . . . [M]arriage exists as a protected legal
"" See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Ca. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); see also Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (restricting marriage to couples of
opposite sex was not irrational or invidious discrimination violative of the equal protection
clause). The appeal in Baker was dismissed for want of substantial federal question, which
operates as a decision on the merits. See Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971). See generally Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges:
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799
(1979).
148 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
150 DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
" 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
182 The text of the Washington ERA is "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972).
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institution primarily because of societal values associated with the propa-
gation of the human race."' 8 Similarly, in a case not involving an ERA,
the court stated: "[Ilt seems beyond dispute that the state has a compel--
ling interest in encouraging and fostering procreation of the race and pro-
viding status and stability to the environment in which children are
raised."154
Some have suggested that ERA's potential for legitimizing marriage
between homosexual persons finds support in the miscegenation case of
Loving v. Virginia.' In Loving, the Supreme Court held Virginia's mis-
cegenation statutes unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment because they were based "solely upon distinc-
tions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted"
conduct if engaged in by members of different races."'" The analogy to
the Loving case proposes that a law permitting a man to marry a woman,
but not a man, creates a classification based solely on sex,'57 and that
under the strict scrutiny standard such a classification is as unconstitu-
tional as one based on race. 158
The analogy to Loving has been rejected in at least two cases based
on the essential nature of marriage as a heterosexual union. In one, the
court stated Loving does not indicate that all state restrictions on the
right to marry are beyond the reach of the fourteenth amendment. But in
common sense and a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction be-
tween a marital restriction based merely on race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex.'" In Singer, the court found in the term
"marriage" no sex-based classification which would trigger application of
the ERA.8 0 This "definitional response" to the issue has been criticized
as producing a "chicken-or-egg type of quandary," '' and as reflecting an
Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 258, 522 P.2d at 1195.
Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124.
188 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
15 Id. at 11.
'6 Even if the strict gender discrimination argument were rejected, it can argued that dis-
criminatory treatment of sexual minorities constitutes discrimination based on sexual stere-
otype, which is itself a form of sex discrimination. See People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706
(Colo. 1976), which interpreted the Colorado ERA as follows: "This amendment prohibit
unequal treatment based exclusively on the circumstance of sex, social stereotypes con-
nected with gender, and culturally induced dissimilarities" (emphasis added). Id.
I" See Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 72-86 (1970) (testimony of Prof. Paul Freund of Harvard Law
School).
" Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
140 Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 252, 522 P.2d at 1191. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th
ed. 1979).
"' See supra note 52.
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anachronistic understanding of the marital institution.""2
A cautious assessment of ERA in this sensitive area of such pastoral
importance cannot overlook the fact that laws, and the interpretation of
laws, necessarily reflect the contemporary mores. What seems an inelucta-
ble interpretation of "sex" (gender) today may seem less clear to some in
years to come. Indeed, some commentators have already felt winds of
change. One law professor has stated: "The constitutional right to privacy
was developed in Griswold [v. ConnecticutP" and its progeny because
the procreational model of sexuality could no longer be sustained by
sound empirical or conceptual argument. Lacking such support, the
procreational model could no longer be legally enforced on the grounds of
the 'public morality .... , ",164 Another has suggested that the extension
of the Griswold privacy rights to single people "signaled a new under-
standing of marriage in the background of constitutional rights. It's the
individual who has the rights, not the couple, not the status entity."'65 Of
interest is the dissent of one judge in a case which upheld the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's criminal sodomy statute."' He wrote: "A mature
individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her
own home, would appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private and
intimate concern. '16
7
As observed earlier in this article, the phrase "on account of sex"
should not be construed other than as referring to gender. However, the
developing constitutional "right of privacy", considered in light of ever-
shifting mores and societal permissiveness, opens the door to a more lib-
eral construction. The phrase "on account of sex" has obvious interpreta-
tional latitude.
C. Tax-Exempt Status of Church Organizations
There are two ways in which ERA could adversely affect the tax-
162 Id.
103-381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10' See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study
in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 981 (1970). Fur-
ther, Professor Richards suggests that:
[i]n the contraception and abortion decisions, the Court impliedly rejected the legiti-
macy of both the classic Augustinian view of human sexuality and the associated
judgments about the exclusive morality of marital procreational sex. The enforcement
of majoritarian prejudices, without any plausible empirical basis, could be indepen-
dently unconstitutional as a violation of due process rationality in legislation.
Id. at 982.
10 See supra note 52.
100 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(three judge court), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
10' Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
exempt status of churches and their institutions and organizations. First,
ERA could be used to support an extension of the reasoning in Bob Jones
University v. United States " to deny tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") 69 to organizations that
discriminate "on account of sex." Second, ERA could be interpreted as
independently prohibiting the government from providing tax benefits to
organizations that discriminate on the basis of sex. The first is a matter of
statutory construction, the second of constitutional construction.
1. Section 501(c)(3)
In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court held that a private educational in-
stitution which followed racially discriminatory policies based on religious
beliefs was not charitable within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the
Code. Noting that such exemptions are justified on the basis that an ex-
empt entity confers a public benefit, 170 the Court concluded that the ra-
cially discriminatory schools (i) violated the fundamental public policy
against racial discrimination in education, and therefore (ii) could not be
deemed to confer a benefit on the public. 17 1 In the Court's view, education
immersed in racial discrimination is robbed of its charitable character.
The Court also concluded that the government's fundamental policy
against racial discrimination in education, and its interest in denying its
support to discriminatory schools, substantially outweigh any burden
which denial of tax-exempt status might impose on the institution's
rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 172 The
Court noted that the financial impact on the schools would not prevent
them from observing their religious tenets.'73
Perhaps significantly, the Court pointedly observed that it was deal-
ing with a religious school, not with churches or other purely religious
institutions, and that the governmental interest was in denying public
support to racial discrimination in education. 174 Confined to its facts, the
immediate impact of Bob Jones is limited to racially discriminatory edu-
cational institutions.
(a) The Church Itself - Clergy
Under the Bob Jones rationale, it could be argued that a church
'" 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
369 IRC § 501(c)(3) (1983).
37 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 582.
1 Id. at 585 n.21.
17 Id. at 590.
173 Id.
17 Id. at 590 n.29.
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which limits its clergy to men violates ERA's fundamental national policy
against discrimination on account of sex, thereby negating any benefits
the church might otherwise confer on the public. If the argument suc-
ceeded, forfeiture of tax-exempt status would result-at least until the
allegedly discriminatory practice is terminated.
The Bob Jones decision was founded on the government's compelling
interest in eliminating racial discrimination in education. In matters in-
volving the internal affairs of churches or religious doctrine, the govern-
ment has no legitimate interest. It is well established that religious free-
dom under the first amendment encompasses the right of religious bodies
to decide matters of church governance and of faith and doctrine, free
from state interference."' Freedom to select clergy has been afforded fed-
eral constitutional protection. 76 Denial of tax-exempt status to churches,
because of the manner in which they select clergy, would raise important
constitutional questions, requiring a balancing of the religious freedom
protected by the first amendment with the policy against sex discrimina-
tion declared in ERA.
A limitation on religious liberty can be justified by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.1 7 7 There is
no question that the loss of tax exemption would place a substantial bur-
den on the free exercise of religion by churches or religious orders. But
such a burden was allowed in Bob Jones. The courts have sustained bur-
dens on free exercise rights in other contexts when an overriding govern-
ment interest required. Under ERA, it would be arguable that the free
exercise clause does not require an exception for the churches or religious
orders from a requirement that tax exemption be denied to organizations
that discriminate on the basis of sex. In the area of race discrimination, at
least twice the Court has stated that the Constitution tolerates but will
not support private discrimination.1 7 8 Under ERA, Bob Jones and earlier
cases 1 79 could be used to support a contention that tax benefits should be
denied to churches that discriminate on the basis of sex, even for religious
'7 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721-22 (1976).
176 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Cath-
olic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
177 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982). The free exercise clause of the first
amendment can require exceptions from laws of general applicability, unless such excep-
tions would unduly interfere with a compelling state interest. Id.; Thomas v. Review Bd. of
the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). However, as was the case in Lee, where
an employer was required to pay into the social security system, despite his religious beliefs
to the contrary, the Court has upheld limitations on religious liberty in order to accomplish
an overriding governmental interest. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
178 Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470
(1973).
"' Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585, 590 n.29.
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reasons.
(b) Sex Distinctions in Educational Institutions
Catholic schools which differentiate on the basis of sex in admissions
or activities could very well be the target of efforts to extend the Bob
Jones reasoning beyond racial discrimination to sex discrimination.
The passage of ERA would surely bolster the argument that single-
sex private schools, or private schools that otherwise differentiate on the
basis of sex (e.g., in the level of extra-curricular activities offered), violate
fundamental public policy, one of the two critical elements in the Bob
Jones rationale. The other, i.e. that such schools should not be deemed to
confer a public benefit, might also be supported by ERA. It could be ar-
gued that sexually discriminatory schools exert a pervasive influence over
the entire educational process, outweighing any public benefit that they
might otherwise provide.8 0 Thus, under the reasoning of Bob Jones, the
tax-exempt status of such schools may well be jeopardized.
Seminaries and novitiates differ from other Catholic schools, and the
schools in Bob Jones, in that their primary function is the education and
training of priests and members of religious orders. Thus, the Bob Jones
reasoning seems less relevant. However, as with churches, it could be ar-
gued that seminaries and novitiates that differentiate on the basis of sex
are not entitled to tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) because they
violate the fundamental public policy of ERA.
(c) Other Church Organizations -E.g., Hospitals and Social Welfare
Agencies
Whether the Bob Jones reasoning could logically be extended to dis-
crimination in charitable areas other than education presents another dif-
ficult question. Organizations that perform public service functions (e.g.,
hospitals and social welfare agencies) are similar to educational institu-
tions in their broad public purposes. If they discriminate on the basis of
sex (e.g., by refusing to perform or fund abortions), they could be said to
violate fundamental public policy thereby meeting the first criterion of
Bob Jones. As in Bob Jones, it could also be argued that their practices
undermine whatever benefits they confer on the public. Thus, ERA could
extend the Bob Jones reasoning to charitable organizations other than
educational institutions. As previously noted for the other categories, it is
questionable whether these organizations could successfully raise free ex-
ercise defenses in the event of denial of tax exemption.
IO The Court in Bob Jones declined to decide whether other kinds of charitable organiza-
tions could also be denied exempt status if they violated public policy. Id. at 586 n.21.
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2. ERA as an Independent Source for Denial of Tax-Exempt Status
The previous discussion focused on the effect of ERA on the inter-
pretation of section 501(c)(3) of the Code. The issue here is whether ERA
would operate independently to prevent the government from extending
tax exemption to organizations that discriminate on the basis of sex.
Neither the legislative history of ERA nor relevant case law provides de-
finitive guidance on this point. By analogy to equal protection principles,
there are two theories upon which it could be argued that ERA prohibits
the grant of tax exemptions to discriminatory organizations, namely
through the application of the "state action" doctrine, and through the
adoption of a standard under ERA which prohibits the government from
aiding discriminatory institutions.
(a) State Action
Current state action principles developed under the fourteenth
amendment require some nexus between the government and the discrim-
inatory practice of a private organization before the latter will be treated
as state action. The Supreme Court recently held that the grant of sub-
stantial funds to a private school did not so involve a state government in
the internal decisions of that school as to warrant treating those decisions
as state action.18' Despite some earlier lower court decisions to the con-
trary,8 2 under current state action principles it is not likely that the dis-
criminatory acts of a private organization would be considered state ac-
tion merely because that organization receives a governmental benefit in
the form of a tax exemption, unless there is also significant governmental
involvement in the discriminatory acts themselves.
(b) Aid To Discriminatory Institutions
Arguably, ERA could be interpreted as prohibiting governmental
programs which have the practical effect of providing aid to discrimina-
tory institutions.8 s There is precedent in the equal protection area to
support this contention.'8 4 In Bob Jones, however, the Court did not
161 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 833 (1982).
161 See Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Or. 1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts
v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
183 Maryland's ERA has recently been interpreted by a trial court as prohibiting a property
tax exemption for a country club which limits its membership to males. See Bainum v.
Maryland, Equity No. 85397 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Sept. 13, 1984).
16 See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 466-67; Moton v. Lambert, 508 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Miss. 1981),
where standing was found in an equal protection challenge to a state tax exemption as ap-
plied to private racially discriminatory institutions.
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reach an analogous question, i.e. whether denial of tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools is independently required by the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment. 8' Thus, until the Court
finally resolves the issue, equal protection precedents provide no defini-
tive guidance as to how ERA would independently affect tax exemption.
Because of the potentially devastating impact that loss of tax exemp-
tion could have on churches and their institutions, clarity is sorely needed
on this issue. Bob Jones demonstrates clearly that free exercise rights can
be burdened in the area of race discrimination.
D. Government Aid Programs-Participation of Church Organizations
Churches and their related organizations participate in numerous
federal and state aid programs involving substantial funds. Programs of
particular importance include education, health and social services. In the
absence of statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination in aid pro-
grams, would ERA independently preclude participation by organizations
which differentiate on the basis of sex (e.g., hospitals, in relation to abor-
tion procedures; schools whose admissions policies or programs differenti-
ate between the sexes; and church agencies which exclude women from
its ministry)? The answer to that question is governed by considerations
already discussed in the area of tax exemption.
As already indicated, mere receipt of governmental benefits would
not establish the necessary nexus with the discriminatory acts of the pri-
vate organization for state action purposes." 6 It is more likely that ERA
could be interpreted as prohibiting governmental programs from provid-
ing aid to institutions that discriminate on the basis of sex. A similar
result was reached in an earlier racial discrimination case under the equal
protection clause. 87 Only recently a lower court concluded that the fed-
eral government could not, consistent with equal protection guarantees,
provide funding to state agencies which engaged in racially discriminatory
practices. 8 8 By analogy, a similar result could be expected under ERA. As
with tax exemption, the result could be the same even where an organiza-
tion discriminates for religious reasons.
E. Statutory Antidiscrimination Provisions-Exceptions Based on Re-
ligious Belief
Questions have been raised concerning the potential impact of ERA
on religiously-based statutory exceptions to anti-discrimination provi-
'a' Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586 n.24.
'" Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838.
187 See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 455.
"8" National Black Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 569 (1983).
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sions.' s9 For example, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. 9 However, Title IX does not apply to an
institution which is controlled by a religious organization if compliance
would contravene its religious tenets. 9 ' Further, the church amend-
ment' 92 allows hospitals participating in certain federal programs not to
perform abortions or sterilizations, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,'9" which prohibits sex discrimination in employment, does not
require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for most
abortions.' 4
In assessing the impact of ERA on these exceptions, a fundamental
189 Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
or the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 24, 1984) (Testimony of John T. Noonan, Uni-
versity of California). Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 23, 1983) (Testimony of
Jeremy A. Rabkin, Cornell University).
'" 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
... 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1982). This exception provides protection for Catholic educa-
tional institutions which, for religious reasons, decline to include abortion coverage in health
benefit programs that arguably could fall within the reach of the Title IX regulations. 34
CFR § 300a-7.
192 Religious organizations are exempted from Title VII only with respect to preferences for
individuals of a particular religion for the performance of work connected with the carrying
on of its activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). Religious organizations are fully subject to
Title VII with respect to other types of discrimination criteria (race, color, sex, or national
origin). E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
'91 42 U.S.C. § 200e(k) (1982). The exception in Title VII was adopted to prevent compro-
mise of the religious freedom of employers having religious or moral objections to abortion.
HREP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4749. Unfortunately, it is not broad enough. It requires employers to include in their
employee health insurance benefits coverage for abortions necessary to prevent endanger-
ment to the mother's life if the fetus were carried to term, and, by implication, coverage for
disability stemming from abortions in their disability insurance benefits and sick leave
plans. See National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Bell, 490 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd, 653 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'" Congressman Sensenbrenner has sponsored an amendment to ERA which would add:
"[n]othing in this article shall be construed to grant or secure any right to abortion or the
funding thereof." The Sensenbrenner proposal would, if approved, avoid the undesirable
linkage of ERA and abortion. The amendatory process, however, requires this caveat. It is
possible that the defeat or rejecting of the Sensenbrenner amendment could be construed by
a court as establishing the intent that ERA is to support abortion. Such a construction by a
court would not necessarily be on solid ground because Congress and legislators could reject
amendments on any number of grounds including convenience. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra
note 6, at 224. One must consult the legislative record, however, to determine whether rejec-
tion of an amendment established definitive legislative intent. See Automobile Trade Ass'n
of Maryland v. Insurance Comm'r, 292 Md. 15, 437 A.2d 199 (1981); City of Ingleside v.
Johnson, 537 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). If so, then that intent would be very helpful
to a reviewing court and possibly harmful to the cause to overturn. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
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principle must be kept in mind, i.e. neither Congress nor a state can enact
a law that denies a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court has
recently held that an exception in Title IX for the admissions policies of
certain single-sex public undergraduate institutions did not exempt a
public nursing school from its obligation, under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, not to deny males the right to en-
roll. Thus, for example, if ERA were interpreted as prohibiting govern-
ment funding of organizations that discriminate on the basis of sex for
any reason, an exception such as the religious tenet exception in Title IX
would probably be invalidated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the present state of the law proscribing sex discrimina-
tion reflects contemporary enlightenment and growth. Further, there is
no indication that there is not more progress to come. On the other hand,
there is also no assurance that the necessary progress will be attained
with the dispatch it deserves. Essentially an overlay upon the equal pro-
tection components of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, ERA would
fortify the existing equal protection guarantees vis-a-vis sex-based
discrimination.
It cannot be gainsaid, however, that ERA is also burdened by poten-
tial collateral effects which are probably unintended by many as undesir-
able, and even alarming. It is not possible to forecast all its effects with
reasonable precision, a reality wrought in part by the dynamics involved
in the complex interplay between ERA and other principles of law which
will govern the judicial interpretive process. However, for all the reasons
discussed in this memorandum, in the present state of the law and ERA's
legislative history, there is no reasonable doubt of its uncertain and far-
reaching adverse implications. As for the legislative history, it is a partic-
ular cause for regret that the debate too often reflects a desire to imbue
the ERA with a purposeful ambiguity, and a willingness to abdicate legis-
lative responsibility in favor of the judiciary.
In the absence of clarifying amendments, or the less secure means of
clarifying legislative history, it is fair to say that ratification of ERA
would set in motion a potent constitutional force, with potentially unde-
sirable as well as desirable results, whose meaning and effect would be as
much a product of skillful advocacy and judicial predilections as of the
will of the people. This is a matter of profound constitutional concern. A
due regard for our national repository of the powers of government and
the rights of the people demand precision both of purpose and expres-
sion. It is true, of course, that it is not possible to draft an ERA in a way
which makes its future application entirely predictable. Every contin-
gency cannot be envisaged. On the other hand, it is possible to draft an
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ERA which, illumined by a well-focused legislative history, will avoid ma-
jor pitfalls which are now readily identifiable. Unlike statutes which are
always subject to amendment by the legislature when deficiencies appear,
if ERA is ratified its course and effect will be in the hands of the judicial
branch.
There is no concern which cannot be resolved, at least substantially,
while still preserving the integrity of the economic and kindred goals
which women seek to achieve and to which their dignity entitles them. I
would counsel constructive endeavors to achieve greater clarity in service
to those goals. Because the legal analysis related to these issues is so com-
plex, and often open to honest differences of informed opinion, the effec-
tive level of resolution is that of consensus on policy and draftsmanship,
not legal disputation. If there is disagreement on the policy to be estab-
lished, that should be straightforwardly addressed. If there is not, good
faith will find a way to express the policy in reasonably clear and effective
terms, buttressed by meaningful legislative history.
